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The Concept of Neutrality in International
Law*
ALFRED P. RUBIN**
I. ORIGINS
A. Religious and Secular Obligations
Earliest written records show an interesting contrast between the no-
tion of war as the imposition on another religious-political organization of
a tribe's "law" in obedience to the directions of a tribal god, presumably
as interpreted by a priestly caste spokesman, and imposition of "law" by
asserting secular "jurisdiction." By the first notion, "neutrality," non-in-
volvement in the struggle for life and dominance, was a temporary politi-
cal fact but inconceivable as a legal status; a state could not opt out of
the struggle for survival any more than a person could. The only path to
avoid the struggle was to die.
Illustrations of this abound. In the Old Testament, God commands
the Jews:
When you draw near to a city to fight against it, offer terms of peace
to it. And if its answer to you is peace and it opens to you, then all the
people who are found in it shall do forced labor for you and shall
serve you. But if it makes no peace with you, but makes war against
you, then you shall besiege it; and when the Lord your God gives it
into your hand you shall put all its males to the sword.. . Thus you
shall do to all the cities which are very far from you, which are not
cities of the nations here. But in the cities of these peoples that the
Lord your God gives you for an inheritance, you shall save alive noth-
ing that breathes, but you shall utterly destroy them ... that they
may not teach you to do according to all their abominable practices
which they have done in the service of their gods, and so to sin against
the Lord your God.'
This command was in fact obeyed literally, according to the Bible, except
for the one case of the Hivites from Gibeon who, masquerading as people
"from a far country," concluded a treaty with the secular leader Joshua
and the leaders of the Hebrew congregation under which peace with
forced labor was provided as a matter of what seems secular Jewish law."
* This article is scheduled to be published also in NEuTRALrry: CHANGING CONCEPTS
AND PRACTICES (Leonard, ed. 1988). The author is grateful to the Institute for the
Comparative Study of Public Policy, University of New Orleans, for permission to print it
here.
** Professor of International Law, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
1. Deuteronomy 20:10-18 (Revised Standard Version).
2. Joshua 9:3-27. It is possibly evidence of one of the underlying roots of the modern
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This religious conception of the impossibility of neutrality with re-
gard to holy commands is carried on in the New Testament where the
universality of monotheism and the conception of life as a continuing bat-
tle between good and evil, between the Kingdom of God and the King-
dom of Satan, is summed up by Jesus: "He who is not with me is against
me, and he who does not gather with me scatters."'
As to the second notion, just as the secular needs of even a conqueror
like Joshua overrode the religious commandments passed to the nation by
the priests, so notions are anciently evident of the limits of legal prescrip-
tion even when uttered by sacerdotal rulers sharing religious worship with
their neighboring kings. The earliest known example of this is about two
centuries after the events narrated in the Book of Joshua; it is in an
Egyptian papyrus of the early Twenty-first dynasty, in the lth century
B.C. An Egyptian priest, Wen-Amon, on a religious tribute-collecting mis-
sion at Dor, on what the translator calls the Syrian coast, was robbed on
his ship in the harbor. He appealed to Beder, the local ruler, also a wor-
shipper of Amon and under Egyptian political influence (although not le-
gal control):
I have been robbed in your harbor. Now you are the prince of this
land, and you are its investigator who should look for my silver. Now
about this silver - it belongs to Amon-Re, King of the Gods, the lord
of the lands ... It belongs to you...
Beder replied:
Whether you are important or whether you are eminent -look here, I
do not recognize this accusation which you have made to me! Suppose
it had been a thief who belonged to my land who went on your boat
and stole your silver, I should have repayed it to you from my trea-
sury, until they had found this thief of yours - whoever he may be.
Now about the thief who robbed you - he belongs to you! He belongs
to your ship! Spend a few days here visiting me, so that I may look for
him.'
The underlying legal conception seems to be that Beder, as the secu-
lar ruler of Dor, alone had the legal power to search out and arrest the
thief in the territory of Dor, but only Wen-Amon and the ship's authori-
ties could make rules to govern what happened on board the ship; that
the limited extent of Beder's jurisdiction made him legally "neutral" with
regard to affairs on board the ship regardless of religious and moral argu-
ments, but that his neutrality could be interpreted to permit, or even to
concept of the bindingness of treaties that this one, procured by fraud, was considered to
supersede even the express command of God. The degree to which any "Jewish" law in the
biblical period can properly be called "secular" is, of course, unclear. But that the treaty was
inconsistent with the religious command is certain. The job of reconciling the two sources of
law, and the two elites responsible for uttering "law" and enforcing it, is best left to histori-
ans and theologians.
3. Matthew 12:30.
4. PRITCHARD, THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST 17-18 (5th ed. 1971).
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require, him to search out an accused thief escaping to his territory and
hand him back to the ship's authorities for legal disposal.5
This conflict between religious obligations to side with God and a
conception of the limits to secular authority and political bases for action
and inaction became most notoriously significant during the days of de-
clining religious influence and expanding secularity in ancient Greece. In
its origins in 435 B.C., the Peloponnesian War was a struggle by Corcyra
to remain unentangled, "neutral," in the internal affairs of Epidamnus. In
Epidamnus, the defeated nobility had sought allies against the popular
party that had taken control of the constitution of the town. When Cor-
cyra would not intervene, the popular party of Epidamnus got help from
Corinth. Corcyra, to maintain what she regarded as her rightful external
relationship with Epidamnus, attacked Corinth. After winning a battle at
Epidamnus, Corcyra admonished Corinth to withdraw from involvement
in affairs between Corcyra and Epidamnus, and called vainly on Sparta to
help. Corcyra, after further defeating Corinth, and not being a member of
either the Athenian or Lacedaemonian League, then appealed to Athens
and offered to join its League. Corinth appealed to Athens to remain
"neutral."' The arguments by Corcyra before the Athenian Assembly
were based on (1) morality and the glory of helping the oppressed against
their oppressors; (2) future interests and the store of gratitude that would
make of Corcyra a reliable ally if Athens later needed help; and (3) cur-
rent interest and the strength of the Corcyran Navy, the second largest
navy in Greece at the time. Corinth also put first emphasis on their moral
stature, denying that Corcyra was an oppressed state but considering her
"criminal" in her acts regarding Epidamnus; secondly, Corinth argued
that admitting Corcyra to the Athenian League would make Athens an
enemy of Corinth and necessarily and legally involve war: "For if you be-
come the allies of the Corcyraeans you will be no longer at peace with us
but will be converted into enemies. But you ought in common justice to
stand aloof from both.. ." The decision by Athens was cynical: Corcyra
was not taken into the full alliance, but a defensive commitment was
made in case of an attack in its territories or the territory of an "ally" of
either. The reason, according to Thucydides, was the military calculation
regarding the strength of the Corcyran navy and Corcyra's strategic loca-
tion between the Peloponnesus and Italy."
The most famous dispute regarding neutrality in the ancient writings
5. It is not suggested that this natural law underpinning to an early, perhaps the earli-
est, non-political extradition arrangement is in any way involved with modern extradition
practice or conceptions. Something like the assumed moral obligation to search out thieves
and hand them over to the territorial authority of the place in which the rights of property
had been violated by them is apparent in a lot of the current rhetoric about terrorists. It
might be noted that Beder denied any legal obligation in this transaction, only promised out
of grace to search for the thief.
6. THUCIDYDES, I THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR 24, 33, 40, in 1 THE GREEK HISTORIANS 565
(F. R. B. Godolphin, ed., 1942).
7. Id. at 44.
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is, of course, the Melian Dialogue of 416 B.C.8 The people of Melos, a
small island, were linked legally and politically to Sparta, but tried to
maintain neutrality in the Peloponnesian war. The Athenians rejected the
Melian argument that Melos, having maintained a strict neutrality in its
actions, there was no justification in law or morality for Athenian action
against it. The Athenian "justification" was that other client states of
Athens would be tempted to "neutrality" if Melos could opt out of the
struggle, and that disintegration of the Athenian system was an even
greater threat to the well-being of Athens than defeat; the primary argu-
ment was thus not military or moral, but expediency and political inter-
est. Eventually the discussion turned towards religion; the Melians ar-
gued that the gods would likely favor the righteous against the
unrighteous, so Athens should think twice about her threat. The response
by the Athenians was that by a law of nature reflecting the gods' will as
perceived by common opinion, it is in the nature of man to rule wherever
he can. This natural law, perceived by physical observation, was said to
justify Athens. Moreover, the Athenians argued, the Spartans themselves
could be seen to identify whatever is expedient with "justice" in their
own transactions outside of their municipal sphere, so the Spartans them-
selves were not likely to believe that they had any obligation to come to
the aid of Melos against Athens. The Melians disagreed on an analysis of
the deeper interest of Sparta in supporting its colonists even when "neu-
tral," but concluded that in any case it should be seen to be in the inter-
est of Athens to leave Melos unmolested. The Athenians made their own
decision and shortly afterwards killed all the military age men, enslaved
the women and children, and colonized with 500 of their own settlers the
island of Melos.
B. Positivism and Natural Law
This is not the place for a deeper analysis, but it is important to an
understanding of the legal and moral underpinnings of the concept of
"neutrality" to know that Aristotle, lecturing in Athens in the middle of
the fourth century B.C., after Athens had lost the Peloponnesian War,
adopted the Athenian view identifying natural law with the observable
physical laws of nature. He rejected the sophists' argument that similar
municipal laws of many states reflect a natural overarching law such as
the physical law that a flame burns upright both in Greece and Persia,
pointing out that notions of "justice" shift and change.9 Cicero, about 300
years later, on the other hand, adopted a view that identified the moral
law, the "vera lex" discoverable by right reason and inherently universal
and eternal, with an overarching and binding system superior to the "pos-
itive" laws of the Roman Senate, and thus superior to the laws of any
single municipal order.10 To the Athenian-Aristotelian "positivist," neu-
8. Id. at V, 84-114, 116.
9. ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1134b18 sec. 7.
10. CICERO, DE RE PUBLICA, III, xxii, 33.
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trality is permissible when acceptable to the legislator of the system
within which it is asserted; when legislation is by such use of force as
seems expedient to the dominant force possessing actor, "neutrality" is
made a permissible legal status only within whatever bounds that legislat-
ing actor allows. In the horizontal, tribal-council-like, legislative structure
of the current international legal order, where legislation is induced from
customary behavior or from treaty commitments, no single state has legis-
lative authority; therefore the bounds of what is "neutral" remain subject
to counter-assertion and change. When legislation is conceived as the
adoption of moral rules perceived by right reason, then "neutrality" is a
matter of each state's claiming the clearest insight into the implicit rules
of the community and quarreling with its neighbors as to which percep-
tion is deepest or reflects the higher values. In neither the physical-natu-
ralist Aristotelian or "positivist," nor the Ciceronian-moralist "natural-
ist," framework is "neutrality" a uniform conception, although to those
who claim a monopoly of moral insight, it does appear to them as if it
were so and they are likely to feel very frustrated by the obtuseness of
their neighbors.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF DOCTRINE
A. "Just war" Doctrine and Neutrality
To "naturalist"-moralist jurists and historians, like the Melians and
the Roman Livy (d. 17 A.D.), breach of "neutrality" in circumstances in
which "law" required neutrality could be seen as a reason for defeat.
Thus, to Livy the Fabian Ambassadors to the Gauls in Etruria (386 B.C.)
violating their legal obligation to abstain from participating in the mili-
tary struggle between Clusium and the Gauls committed an unjust action
worse than the injustice of the Gauls' attack on Clusium. That delict, in
Livy's view, justified the sack of Rome itself by the Gauls."' The gods
took care of enforcing the law.
With the development of political influence in the moral institution
of the Church, moral-natural law theory was strengthened and became
more abstract. The notion that God enforces "justice" was too simplistic
to survive in a world that read the Biblical book of Job, and the religious
notion of "just war" became part of the currency of legal as well as moral
thought.
In order to clear away some confusion in modern literature, it should
be pointed out that the phrase itself, "just war," is not a correct transla-
tion of the pre-renaissance Latin "bellum justum." "Jus" in Ciceronian
Latin related to "law," not "justice;" "lex," as in "vera lex," the eternal
and universal rules superior to positive law, more nearly approximated
11. LtvY, HISTORY OF ROME V, 36-49. Modern scholarship regards the entire narrative as
baseless in fact except for the sack of Rome. See OGLVIE, A COMMENTARY ON LivW BOOKS 1-
5, at 716 (1965).
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our concept of "justice." But the reception into English, via clerical
scribes, of the Latin genitive "legis" as the root of our word "legislation,"
and the insistence of natural law scholars that their conceptions of "jus-
tice" were binding as "law" universally, and their appropriation of the
word "jus" to emphasize the legally binding effect of "lex," seem to have
led to a reversal of meanings in English.
The first use of the phrase "just war" in a sense that has survived
and had direct influence was by St. Augustine," who suggested about 420
A.D. that the injustice of an opposing side might require a wise man to
wage war, and that no other war than such an one is morally defensible.
But, if moral law is binding not only on conscience but in action, and
injustice can morally require a military response, then surely "neutrality"
in some cases is not only morally reprehensible, but also illegal.
It would serve no point to trace in detail the elaboration of this thesis
in medieval legal theory. Those aspects of the definition of "just war"
that relate to the legal authority of the parties to engage in duels or wars
are of no concern to the concept of "neutrality," nor are questions of per-
sonal capacity to bear arms in feudal theory. But the idea that there must
be a "just cause" (e.g., a prior injury) and a "just object" (i.e., no better
way to resolve the dispute) to the recourse to arms, and that there must
be a "just intention" (i.e., a personal commitment to the righting of a
moral wrong as the dominant motivation for the war), notions that speak
to the belligerents and imply some need for jus standi, some legal inter-
est in the struggle, presume an underlying concept of neutrality. Those
who lack the standing; the just cause, object or intention, have no moral
or legal basis for participating in the armed struggle. Neutrality for them
would not be a right, but an obligation.
Interestingly, Islamic legal theory seems to have paralleled Christian
thought in this regard, as Ibn Khaldun, writing about 1377 A.D., also di-
vides wars into categories of "just" and "unjust." He reserved for the
"just war" category only wars required by religious law (which included
rules of normal behavior, since the Koran, to Muslims, is the primary
source for legal rules as well as a religious work in the secular Western
sense)"s and "dynastic war," presumably war based on vindicating a right
to inherit authority, which also has at least overtones of religious law. "
Now, if wars within the legal order could be classified as "just" or
"unjust" and "neutrality" was an obligation in most cases even with re-
gard to "just wars," the situation was quite different with regard to wars
fought with those outside the order. In Western legal theory, Crusades,
12. St. AUGUSTINE, DE CivrrATE DEi XIX, 7.
13. To translate this conception into more familiar terms, the Koran might be com-
pared to the Pentateuch in Jewish society; the rules of behavior in Leviticus and here and
there elsewhere, like the rules explicit and implicit in the New Testament, are binding in
daily life to those within the religious worship; to those who, in St. Augustine's felicitous
phrase, live in the City of God.
14. IBN KHALDUN, THE MUQADDIMAH 224 (Rosenthal, trans., Dawood, ed., abr. ed. 1967).
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religious wars, were a moral obligation and to establish a legal right to
abstain from such a war seems to have involved strains and ultimately a
rejection of the bindingness of the order itself. Quite apart from the
struggles within Europe between Church and State authorities for the ul-
timate power to make law, it is probably not merely coincidental that the
split between the Eastern Church and Rome occurred formally in 1054
A.D. and relations between the Byzantine rulers and the "Franks"
("Kelts" to Anna Comnena) were established on strictly secular lines with
the Empire feeling no obligation at all to help in the struggle of "Chris-
tendom" to "recover" the Holy Land." Byzantium remained "neutral" as
suited her political situation.
In Islamic theory such "neutrality" would have been hard to justify,
and the classical distinction between the Dar-al-Salaam and the Dar-al-
Harb, the lands in which applied the laws of peace based on the Koran
and the lands in which Islamic peoples were bound by the laws of strug-
gle, seem to allow of no intermediate status. 6 On the other hand, there is
ample evidence that in practice Islamic rulers did in fact conclude armi-
stices and treaties with non-Islamic authorities, and "neutrality" was
practiced regardless of the "natural" or "divine law" theories.
The Christian theory was necessarily modified as the balance of in-
fluence in daily affairs changed between the secular legal order on the one
hand, and the religious legal order interpreted by the Papacy on the
other. The moral requirement of a crusade lost its persuasiveness over
time, and the struggle among temporal rulers for empire assumed a larger
role in statecraft, although until the 16th century in Europe the major
rationalizers of policy remained clergymen. Even in countries faithful to
the Catholic institutions, like Spain, by the early 1500s, difference in reli-
gion was rejected by influential advisers as a cause of "just war. 17 In-
deed, the only just cause admitted by Vitoria was response to a wrong
received, and then only a proportional response limited to righting the
wrong. 8 The wars of conquest in the New World were rationalized by this
enlightened writer as vindicating the legal rights of trade, transit and
peaceful sojourn found in natural law, evidenced by various analogies and
the jus gentium adopted as municipal law in many European nations.
Religious wars, to protect native converts from their neighbors, and to
end the abominable practices of the Indians, which were viewed as violat-
ing natural and divine law at least when they involved human sacrifice,
were also permissible.' 9 But from the point of view of this brief study, the
most significant basis found for engaging in a "just war" was to assist
15. COMNENA, THE ALEXIAD, 309 sq. (1148 A.D.) (Sewter, trans., 1979); Cf. BERMAN, LAW
AND REVOLUTION 104-105 (1983).
16. SHAYBANI, SIYAR 75 sq. (c. 800 A.D.) (Translated as KHADDURI,THE ISLAMIC LAW OF
NATIONS (1966)).
17. VITORIA, DE INDIS, §§ 427-429 (1532, 1557, 1580 rev., Carnegie Endowment, 1917).
18. Id. at 430.
19. Id. at 386-403.
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"allies and friends." Support for this was found in Roman practice and
Biblical incident when Abraham was said to have fought with the "King
of Salem" and others against four kings who had done Abraham himself
no injury.2" This expansion of "just war" theory, to allow for collective
action by those who had not suffered injury taking part of one who had,
was to have major consequences.
B. The Resurgence of Positivism
Positivism makes a resurgence as the authority of the institution of
the Church broke down. Doctrinally, it might be a significant marker that
by 1612 even the Catholic jurist Suarez, by some viewed as the founder of
modern international law, distinguished between the jus gentium reflect-
ing natural law perceived by all or many societies and jus gentium as the
coincidental prescriptions of different municipal legal orders reflecting
only similar policy choices, thus part of the human or positive law and
not necessarily reflecting natural law.2" But the great founder of modern
positivism was Alberico Gentili, an Italian Protestant Civil law expert
teaching at Oxford. His pleas as an advocate for Spain in the Royal Coun-
cil sitting in Admiralty" evidence the long and complex evolution of Mar-
itime law as applied to questions of belligerent rights and neutrality. It
was in this area that technical rules of neutrality arose and found their
greatest elaboration.
In the earliest days of recorded European civilization north of the
Alps, private reprisals were the normal way of resolving conflicting asser-
tions of right. "Just war" theory under a feudal political organization
made the natural law of reprisal, taking back that which has been un-
justly taken away by another, available to equals on the feudal scale
nearly at all levels. With the growing centralization of authority in the
13th century, one of the areas into which royalty moved at the expense of
its magnates was control of activity outside the boundaries of a county. In
England, by the end of the 14th century this took the form of the King
appointing an "Admiral" as his direct subordinate to issue "letters of
20. Id. at 405. The Biblical incident is cited by Vitoria to Genesis 14. In that place, the
incident is justified on the basis of the aggressive Kings (against Sodom, not Salem) having
taken prisoner Lot, Abram (not yet Abraham's) nephew. Obviously, in the light of kinship
ties in the society described in the Old Testament, Abram did have standing based on the
injury to Lot, his nephew. Vitoria's conclusion thus seems unsupported by his appeal to
Divine Law. Distortion of the facts to create a legal argument is not uncommon in publicists
of international law, even today, but this seems egregious.
21. SUARE Z, DE LEGlus, Ac DEO LEGISLATORE, II, 187-188 (1612) (1944 ed.).
22. English Admiralty law was based on the code of judicial decisions of the Island of
Oleron adopted by statute in England about the end of the 12th century. It was supple-
mented by Roman law principles and the Admiralty advocates were all trained in Roman
(Civil) law. Gentili seems routinely to have had his Spanish clients sell their interests to
English people, so he could always appear to be arguing English interest as the ultimate
beneficiary of the Spanish claims. See GErNri, HISPANIcAE ADVOCATIONIS (pleas of 1605-
1608, published 1613) (1921 ed.).
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marque and reprisal" to private individuals authorizing reprisals. The
Admiral then conducted a tribunal before which "prizes" were brought
and title adjudged according to the rules promulgated by the Admiral.
Since title, to be useful with regard to ships and articles in international
commerce, had to be accepted as valid in foreign countries, the "natural
law" basis for the rules of Admiralty, particularly the rules of "prize," was
vigorously asserted. The rules of Admiralty were asserted to be of univer-
sal validity; argumentation before Admiralty tribunals rested on Roman
law and on scholarly writings that seemed to have wide appeal. Since the
statutory laws of Oleron dealt in the main with distributing the risks of a
voyage among persons all subject to the laws of the "flag" state of the
vessel, and not with the laws of naval prize, there was no serious conflict
between the statute law and the natural law as they both evolved, and
eventually they evolved together.
The elaboration of the rules of prize reached major levels of interest
and complexity during the 16th century. During that century privateering
as an act of private reprisal authorized by a state, and privateering as a
belligerent act of the state by which mariners were encouraged by the
potentialities of great private profit to risk their ships and lives in naval
adventures, lost their distinction. By about 1600, it had become clear that
privateering was an act of the state and implied that the special laws of
naval warfare applied and the special Admiralty laws of prize. This meant
that specification of the permissible targets of privateering was essential
if the sovereign were not to get embroiled in naval struggles against the
whole maritime world at the discretion of a profit-seeking privateer under
an imprecise letter of marque. But, to say that no ship flying a "neutral"
flag, or a flag not specified as a proper target in the letters of marque,
could go entirely free was to invite foreign and even domestic merchants
to fly false neutral flags in order to protect their cargoes and ships. The
answer adopted by England as she became the strongest sea power in the
world was the elaboration through judicial pronouncements in Admiralty
and prize of the validity at law of certain captures from neutrals and the
invalidity of others.
Gentili was a central figure in this rapid evolution. While this is not
the place to analyze his logic in any depth, his Spanish advocacy is filled
with argumentation about the limits of neutral and belligerent rights as a
matter of law. For example, in one case an English ship (with apparent,
but unstated, Spanish connections) taking some militarily useful material
to Constantinople was captured by privateers from Sardinia and Malta. It
was in the interest of Gentili's clients that the taking be held improper.
Gentili states the arguments against his clients by citing Justinian's code
as forbidding trade with heathendom, thus holding the Civil Law against
them. He then finds religious Canon Law to the same effect. Turning to
the "jus gentium," the "law of nations," he finds a precedent against his
clients in English complaints to the Hanseatic League trading in military
supplies to Spain at a time when Spain was at war with England, a com-
plaint based on the logic of reciprocity and the Golden Rule. He even
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finds a treaty between England and Spain under which each party under-
took to prevent its nationals trading in munitions of war with an enemy
of the other. He then turns the arguments around, principally on the ba-
sis that most of the goods carried by his clients were not "contraband,"
i.e., that the goods had no significant military use, and construing the
prior arguments to be valid only in the case of a short list of military
hardware. Thus, he argued for the return of the bulk of the cargo and of
the ship itself. As to the militarily useful material, he argued that it was
part of the ship's own store, not for distribution to the Turks in Constan-
tinople, and therefore, not subject to confiscation in prize.2"
This particular case does not illustrate any great jurisprudential shift
from naturalism to positivism, but such a shift was in fact under way and
is made more evident in a series of three cases argued by Gentili concern-
ing the proper classification of the Barbary states: Pirates or Sovereign
equals of England? 24 The progression is clear. In the first case, Gentili
argued that the Barbary authorities should be classified as pirates, thus in
law unable to change title to captured goods; in the second he dithered on
the point, and in the third he came to precisely the opposite conclusion,
that those who purchase captured goods and ships in Algiers get good
title, therefore the Barbary states must be classified as sovereign, able to
make and enforce the law, and not as "pirates." In all three his logic is
invincibly "positivist." He finds his legal categories to suit the policy
ends: In the first, to inhibit legally the establishment of markets able to
pass good title in a place close to the lines of trade where captures of
doubtful validity are likely to occur; by the third, that the need for cer-
tainty of title in goods and ships purchased dictates the need for markets
able to establish valid title close to the lines of trade where such ques-
tions are likely to arise. The notion that the legal rule is not the abstrac-
tion perceived by moral reasoning and applied in order to do "justice" is
impliedly rejected. Instead, the basic logic rests on expediency, political
choice by the law-maker, in this case by the English Royal Council able
by its decision to determine the law that will be applied in England with
regard to such title transfers.
The jurisprudential battles raged throughout the 17th century, but
by the early eighteenth century it was clear that in practice the "posi-
tivists" had won and it was important then to find a way to "legislate"
the rules in the community of sovereign equals that emerged from the
religious and dynastic wars and the constitutional shifts of authority
within the leading European trading states of the 17th century. The way
found was by treaty. In the elaborate series of treaties that formed the
Peace of Utrecht at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713,
rules were bargained for and agreed through a negotiating process that
took account of the needs of both belligerents and neutrals, because each
23. Id. at I. The actual decision in the case is not known, only Gentili's argument.
24. Id. at iv, xv, xxii.
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party could imagine itself in either position in some future war. The hold-
ing of "prize courts" was agreed by the parties to those treaties address-
ing the matter to be a belligerent right; states undertook that when neu-
tral in a conflict in which the other party to the treaty was a belligerent,
not to permit the other belligerent to disencumber itself of its naval cap-
tures in any of the neutral's ports. The rule argued for by Gentili was
adopted by treaty between England and France that free (neutral) ships
and their cargoes are free to trade with an enemy without fear of capture
and condemnation in prize except with regard to contraband on board the
vessel: "Free ships shall make free goods except contraband" was the
phrase. A separate article defines "contraband." Yet another article speci-
fies items that are by the parties deemed in law not to be contraband, and
that list includes "all Provisions which serve for the Nourishment of
Mankind and the Sustenance of Life," and all things proper either for
building or repairing ships "and all other Goods whatever, which have not
been worked into the form of any Instrument or Thing prepared for War,
by Land or by Sea.""5 Obviously, the specification of precisely what the
belligerent's rights are against neutrals, and what the neutral's rights are
against belligerents, and the definitions of contraband, are matters that
would vary from negotiation to negotiation, and the positive law would
determine in each case with regard to each incident what the respective
rights were. In the absence of treaty, the questions would be left to diplo-
matic discussion and prize cases in which the national policy interest in
universal uniformity of the law might dictate reference to an otherwise
inapplicable treaty, but in which such a reference would not necessarily
produce the uniformity that would be wanted because the judge in prize
would not have his interpretation tested by the possible remonstrances of
the actual parties to the treaty and their adjustment of its terms by sup-
plemental negotiation. And treaty texts negotiated in different political
contexts had different terms. There was no necessary uniformity in the
treaties taken as a group.
To expand the authority of belligerents with strong navies, the rules
surrounding naval blockade had been elaborated in prize courts to permit
complete interdiction of neutral trade with an enemy port when the
blockade was publicly declared and could be maintained effectively, i.e.,
not merely imposed by paper to give a legal basis for sporadic captures of
neutral vessels engaged in non-contraband trade with the enemy. But by
the end of the century it had become clear that reference to even identi-
cal texts of different treaties could not create a uniform law. When
France and Spain declared war on Great Britain in 1780, the Baltic states
found their trade interrupted by British privateers and naval ships.
25. 28 Cons. Tr. Series 3 (French text). The English text used here is from a book of
EXTRACTS FROM THE SEVERAL TREATIES SUBSISTING BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND OTHER
KINGDOMS AND STATES, OF SUCH ARTICLES AND CLAUSES AS RELATE TO THE DuTY AND CONDUCT
OF THE COMMANDERS OF THE KING OF GREAT-BRITAIN'S SHIPS OF WAR 1, arts. 17, 19, 20 at 5,
7-8 (London 1741).
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Under the leadership of Russia, they, ie., Denmark and Sweden, later
joined by Prussia, declared their own interpretation of the privileges of
neutrals in maritime war, and began to defend those rights by force.
The "armed neutrality" episodes of 1780 and 1800, coupled with an
evolution of British administration and centralized authority over an in-
creasing area impossible to govern effectively from London alone, can be
argued to have ended the practice of licensing privateers in Europe. If
"free flags" really covered "enemy goods except contraband," there was
every incentive for even belligerent traders to ship their goods on neutral
vessels, and the profits dropped out of privateering.26 By 1856, the perti-
nent rules of naval warfare could be reduced to a simple prohibition of
privateering and three statements of principle: Neutral flag covers enemy
goods except contraband; neutral goods other than contraband are free on
board even enemy ships; and a blockade, to have legal effect against neu-
tral trade, must be effective, i.e., maintained by a force sufficient really to
prevent access to the coast of the enemy."1
III. CODIFICATION
As the positivist impulse ground itself more deeply into the legal or-
der during the 19th century, the utility of neutrality as a concept, and the
possibility that it might be expedient to use that concept to accomplish
humanitarian purposes, thus to satisfy "natural law" in its "morality"
guise, became apparent. In 1863 the United States issued its General Or-
ders 100 to the Union Armies in the Field which recited that honorable
belligerents allow themselves to be guided by flags or signals of protection
to avoid firing on hospitals.2" The next year in Geneva the first multilat-
eral convention directed solely toward the amelioration of the condition
of the wounded in war was concluded. Most of the major states of Europe
were signatories, although such important signatory states as France and
Spain ultimately failed to ratify it. It provided for "Ambulances and Mili-
tary hosptials" to be "neuter" and as such to be protected and respected
by belligerents as long as used by the sick or wounded and not by mili-
tary forces as such. 9 In 1868 an additional convention amended the 1864
convention somewhat and extended the applicable provisions to naval
warfare. It also adopted the "white flag with a red cross" as the protecting
symbol. s0
The positivist impulse to codify and transform whatever principles
might be derived from practice, diplomatic correspondence, moral insight
26. At least, that is the conclusion in BERGBOHM, DIE BEWAFFNETE NEUTRALITAT, 1780-
1783 (1884), (translated and extracted in 2 Scor, THE ARMED NEUTRALITIES OF 1780 AND
1800 2, at 4 (1918)).
27. Declaration of Paris, 16 April 1856, 46 Br. and For. St. Papers 137.
28. SCHINDLER & TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICT 18 (2nd rev. ed. 1981) (The
"Lieber" Code, arts. 115, 116).
29. 129 CTS 361.
30. 138 CTS 189.
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and other sources into law binding because of the form in which produced
probably hit its peak with regard to the law relating to neutrality with the
great 1899 and 1907 partial codifications of the laws of war at The Hague.
It cannot be the function of this study to examine the extraordinarily
complex role that neutrality had assumed in the legislative thinking of
the framers of the 1899 and 1907 conventions, or, for that matter, the
1904 convention regarding hospital ships, the 1906 convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the
Field, the 1909 London Declaration concerning the Laws of Naval War-
fare, or, indeed, any of the other documents attempting with ever increas-
ing particularity to provide detailed rules which would distinguish be-
tween legitimate military targets and targets that should be "neutral." All
the conventions presume a legal status of "neutrality" and provide for
rights of neutrals against belligerents, and obligations of "neutrals" owed
to belligerents. In a positivist legal order, states assert rights for them-
selves and obligations for others on the basis of autointerpretation, mu-
nicipal tribunals are bound by national constitutions to interpret the law
as accepted for purposes of adjudication by the particular constitutional
order creating the municipal tribunal. They are not bound (in most cases
barely influenced) by the opinions of sister tribunals pronouncing inter-
pretations of municipal law or the municipal version of international law
for other states. Even with regard to the uniform law adopted by lan-
guage formulations in multilateral conventions, national interpretations
by the organs of states deriving their authority from municipal constitu-
tions and answerable to municipal constituents, are the rule. From this
point of view it is impossible to generalize about "neutrality" in the ab-
stract; to conceptualize principles from the evidence of particulars even in
multilateral conventions negotiated wholly within the international legal
order. The political process by which the formulations are negotiated
does not reflect attempts to approximate an abstract law dimly perceived
by mankind's fallible reasoning powers and susceptible to scholarly re-
finement; it reflects political compromise based on perceptions of national
expediency in a negotiating context, similar to the political process by
which individual municipal systems legislate. Suarez's valid stated dis-
tinction between the jus gentium and "natural law" blocks the analysis.
But the other meaning of jus gentium familiar to naturalist jurists
and now codified in article 38.1.c of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, the search for general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations as evidence of general principles binding states in the interna-
tional legal order, can proceed.
IV. THE REVIVAL OF NATURALISM AND NEUTRALITY
Natural law thinking was never wholly overcome by the rise of posi-
tivism. Whatever the logical weaknesses of the approach, it is also possi-
ble to seek some abstract conception of "neutrality" by examining munic-
ipal legislation to see if the political legislative processes of different
countries, reflecting different political pulls, still come to the same result,
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reflecting perhaps some consistent common thread. It is also possible to
engage directly in moral argument, weighing the values protected by com-
peting rules and deriving an ideal conception of what "neutrality" should
be if it is to maximize the values implicit in the moral system of the inter-
national order. The first job, weighing the national statutes of many dif-
ferent countries to look for their common base, is at this point impossible.
The groundwork has been done"' but the job of collating the data re-
flected in the form of legislation in many different countries is far too big
for a single researcher with limited time. It might, however, be of some
interest just to note some of the more significant points of United States
neutrality legislation. It should be borne in mind that this legislation is
the product of a constitutional order in which the authority of the legisla-
tive branch of government is restricted. Thus, it cannot be pretended that
the restrictions placed by legislation on the activities of American nation-
als abroad or any persons within American territory necessarily exhaust
the legal obligations of the United States under the international law re-
garding neutrality; there may be international legal obligations which the
United States is bound to observe in the international legal order, but
which it cannot enforce against persons within its prescriptive jurisdiction
for constitutional reasons. Nor can it be argued convincingly that all the
restrictions adopted by the American Congress to avoid foreign entangle-
ments represent the translation into municipal law of abstract principles
of international law. The debates in the United States concerning the leg-
islation rarely referred to international obligations, but reflected predomi-
nantly the opinions of the American legislators as to the expedient inter-
ests of the United States.
The first "Neutrality" legislation of the United States was the Act of
5 June 1794.32 Under this statute, it was made subject to criminal penal-
ties for "any citizen of the United States" acting "within the territory" or
"jurisdiction" of the United States, to exercise a commission to "serve a
foreign prince or state in war by land or sea." The dual qualification of
citizenship and territoriality would have left John Paul Jones, a citizen,
free to accept a naval commission from Russia because his service in war
by sea was outside the territory or jurisdiction, as jurisdiction was then
conceived, of the United States. Jones had in fact accepted such a com-
mission as Rear Admiral in the Russian Navy and fought against Turkey
in 1788-1789 without renouncing his American citizenship. He had died in
Paris in 1792. Many other Americans accepted commissions as privateers
against Spain from Buenos Aires during the second decade of the 19th
century without running afoul of the Neutrality Act.
Section 2 of the Act of 1794 made it a crime in American law for any
person, regardless of citizenship, to enlist in foreign military or pri-
vateeering service in the territory of the United States, or to hire another
31. F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, NEUTRALITY LAWS, REGULATIONS AND TREATIES (2 vols.)
(1939).
32. 1 Stat. 381; Id., at 1079.
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person within United States territory to go abroad and enlist. Exceptions
were made for enlisting in a friendly foreign privateer or warship tran-
siently in the United States, and for a locus poenitentiae, an exemption
for persons illegally enlisting who, within thirty days, came home and
gave information leading to the conviction of the person soliciting enlist-
ments for the foreign state. This last exception was deleted by a super-
seding statute in 1818.
Section 3 forbade the arming or fitting out within the United States
of a foreign privateer or naval vessel knowing it to be for employment
against another foreign country with which the United States was at
peace. It did not apply to the acts of American citizens abroad.
Section 4 forbade in the United States the augmenting of existing
armaments on a foreign vessel merely owned by foreigners whose prince
was at war with another country at peace with the United States.
Section 5 forbade any person within the United States to "prepare
the means for any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from
thence gainst the territory ... of any foreign prince or state with whom
the United States are at peace." In 1917, this provision was augmented by
forbidding also the furnishing of money in the United States for military
or naval expeditions against friendly foreign states."3
All these provisions, with the amendments noted, and with some mi-
nor technical modifications, are still in force in the United States.
It seems noteworthy that this original view of "neutrality" main-
tained since 1794 emphasizes the territory of the United States as the
limit of prescriptive authority. The only provisions dealing with activity
outside the United States relate to enlistments set in motion under ar-
rangements made within the United States. The only mention of citizens
of the United States does not extend jurisdiction to actions abroad, but,
in section 1, limit the territorial prescription to exempt foreigners who
have foreign commissions from their scope; foreigners with foreign com-
missions can legally "exercise" those commissions within the territory of
the United States or on board American vessels, subject, of course, to
other laws of the United States which might make criminal here any of
the particular actions that might be required by some foreign government
under its commissions.
The continued validity of section 5, and its place in the basic net-
work of criminal law certainly raises questions about unlicensed fund-
raising and other private activities in the United States in support of for-
eign "freedom fighters" against the governments of countries with which
33. The augmentation was merely to insert the words "or furnishes the money for, or
who takes part in" between "prepare the means for" and "any military expedition." F. DEAK
& P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1097, reprinting 18 U.S.C. § 25 (1934 ed.). The current codifi-
cation appears in 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1976 ed.). The history of this language is summarized by
the Editor's Note in F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1081. The key amendment was
made in the Act of 15 June 1917, § 8, 40 Stat. 217 at 221.
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the United States is at peace, like Nicaragua. Whether or not permitting
such fund-raising to continue is a violation of the public international law
regarding neutrality, a question as to which the municipal statute is not
determinative and, in theory, not even very persuasive, there are certainly
questions about the apparent failure to enforce the law by those officials
in the United States who are charged with constitutional responsibility
under the President to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed.""'
It is, of course, possible that the fund-raising and other activities in the
United States of supporters of the Nicaraguan "contras" have not been
supporting any "military or naval expeditions" but only activities unre-
lated to the ongoing hostilities in Nicaragua, despite the talk of helicop-
ters and support for the struggle that the fund-raisers are reported to
have used so freely. And activities by our government directly are author-
ized by later statutes which, to the degree inconsistent with the 1794 stat-
utes as occasionally re-enacted, would supersede them.
An Act of 14 June 1797 forbidding the fitting out of privateers by
citizens of the United States outside the territory of the United States for
employment against friendly foreign powers or against citizens of the
United States or their property, extended the jurisdictional conception
beyond territoriality. The Act specifically applied to the actions of Ameri-
can citizens abroad only. It was renewed in 1818 but repealed in 1909."5
Presumably the repeal was based upon the almost universal abolition of
privateering by the middle of the 19th century, and not any return to a
strict territorial conception of prescriptive jurisdiction, any perceived
loosening of the international legal obligations of a neutral state, or any
change in the perceived expediency of preventing citizens entangling the
United States in foreign complications or preying on their fellow-citizens.
On 20 April 1818 a new "Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes
Against the United States" 36 reenacted the provisions of the Act of 1794
and the Act of 1797 summarized above making one significant change;
section 2 of the Act of 1794 was extended to forbid, within the territory of
the United States, entering into the service of a foreign "colony, district,
or people" as well as a foreign prince or state. The purpose was to forbid
the use of the United States territory as a recruiting ground for foreign
revolutions. In 1818, Latin American wars of independence were at issue
and, as noted, above, many Americans in fact enlisted in the revolution-
ary cause and took out privateers' licenses from unrecognized revolution-
ary authorities to fight against Spain.37
34. U.S. CONST. art. II, sec. 3.
35. F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1083.
36. 3 Stat. 447, DEAK & JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1085.
37. This caused significant legal problems in the United States when the authority of
the Latin American authorities to condemn Spanish vessels in prize arose. See U.S. v.
Palmer et al., 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). Nor does it appear that the United States had
provided by the neutrality legislation the legal means necessary to enforce against American
citizens United States obligations under Pinckney's Treaty with Spain dated 27 October
1795, 11 Bevans 516, 53 CTS 9. Article 14 of that Treaty obliged each party to punish as a
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The first legislation authorizing an American official abroad to use
"such force as may at the time be within his reach, belonging to the
United States" to "prevent the citizens of the United States from enlist-
ing in the military or naval service" of foreign countries to make war
against a third state with which the United States was at peace, i.e., ex-
tending the reach of the Neutrality Act of 1794 provisions to the actions
of Americans outside the territory of the United States, related only to
American Ministers and Consuls in China, Japan, Siam, Persia and other
countries where by treaty the United States officials had the authority to
apply American law directly to citizens through consular courts."s
Limitations on the export of what some belligerent might want to call
contraband do not appear in American municipal legislation until 1898,
when the Congress authorized the President to prohibit by Executive Or-
der the "export of coal or other material used in war."' 9 It was repealed in
1922. Meantime, in 1912, 1915, 1916 and 1917, by a series of statutes Con-
gress authorized wider and wider discretion in the President to control
American trade in the interest of "neutrality." The 1912 Act recites only
concern about "domestic violence" in Latin America,40 but the succeeding
statutes related much more generally to "the existence of war to which
the United States is not a party,""' "the existence of a war in which the
United States is not engaged,"'" and "a war in which the United States is
a neutral nation."'43 Since the last of these three statutes was passed after
the United States joined in the European War of 1914-1918, presumably
it reflects the experience of the United States as a neutral in the changed
world of the twentieth century, and is not bound to the immediate "expe-
diency" considerations of the statutes passed in response to ongoing cri-
ses. Indeed, the 1917 Act, slightly modified in parts, served the United
States neutrality interest during the first two years of the 1939-1945 war
in Europe and the first four years of the 1937-1945 war in the Far East.
"pirate" its citizens taking letters of marque to act against the subjects or property of the
other in times of peace between the United States and Spain. No prosecutions for "piracy"
have been found in which this language was significant, and the one famous case in which
the Executive officials of the United States thought it should apply resulted in an acquittal.
Lewis, John Quincy Adams and the Baltimore "Pirates", 67 A.B.A.J. 1011 (1981).
38. 12 Stat. 72 at 77, The Act of 22 June 1860, § 24, reproduced in F. DEAK & P.
JESsUP, supra note 31, at 1086.
39. 30 Stat. 739; F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1088. There are other statutes,
not reproduced by Deak & Jessup, which involved conceptions of "neutrality." But they
seem to have been more a response to political pressures than the implied acceptance of any
particular obligation as a matter of natural law. E.g., the Act supplementary to the Act of 20
April 1818 "for the prevention of American Armed expeditions against certain Foreign Ter-
ritories [in Canada] conterminus with those of The United States," 10 March 1838, repro-
duced in 26 B.F.S.P. (1837-1838) 1349. The Act expired in 1840 and was not renewed.
40. 37 Stat. 630; F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1089.
41. 38 Stat. 1226 (Act of 4 March 1915); F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1089.
42. 39 Stat. 756 (Act of 8 September 1916); F. DEAK & P. JESSUP, supra note 31, at
1090.
43. 40 Stat. 217 (Act of 15 June 1917) at p. 221, Title V of the Act; F. DEAK & P.
JESSUP, supra note 31, at 1092.
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Somewhat modified, it is still in force.
The 1917 Act authorizes but does not compel the President to forbid
the departure from the jurisdiction of the United States of any vessel,
domestic or foreign, which "is about to carry fuel, arms, ammunition,
men, supplies, dispatches, or information to any warship... of a foreign
belligerent nation in violation of the laws, treaties, or obligations of the
United States under the law of nations." It is not entirely clear what the
Congress thought the "law of nations" might require in this regard. More-
over, since the authority granted to the President is discretionary in him,
it would seem that the Congress was actually authorizing him to permit
acts which would place the United States in violation of the "law of
nations."'
Section 2 of the Act authorizes the President to forbid the departure
from the United States of any vessel owned in part by an American, or
any foreign vessel not a public vessel at the time it entered an American
port, which is "manifestly built for warlike purposes."
Section 3 forbids the delivery from American jurisdiction of any ves-
sel potentially a vessel of war to be delivered under contract to a belliger-
ent nation. It does not authorize any Presidential discretion in this regard
and can be viewed as implementing a view of neutral obligations which
the United States had adopted during the American Civil War when the
Confederate forces bought ships and supplies in England. The United
States had then strongly protested the English breach of "neutrality,"
which the British had denied was a breach of "neutral" obligations at
all.4
44. The President's obligation to faithfully execute the laws was probably felt to assure
that he would not permit the departure of vessels in violation of other laws of the United
States; the statute of 1917 certainly does not supersede obligations of the President, only
authorize further action to implement his obligations. By Article VI of the Constitution,
treaties are also law in the United States and subject to the same obligation in the Execu-
tive. It is an unresolved question whether the obligations of the United States under general
international law are part of the legal order established by the Constitution. See Rubin,
Professor D'Amato's Concept of American Jurisdiction is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J.
INT'L L. 105 (1985).
45. The British Government eventually agreed to the United States position for the
purpose of re-establishing friendly relations with the victorious Union, and an international
arbitration instructed as to this view of the law awarded the United States an indemnity of
$15.5 million in 1872. See 1 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 315, 343 (1898). In the
attempted codification of the law in 1907, The Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights
and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on Land, art. VII, it is provided that "A
neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or
other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be
of use to an army or a fleet." On the other hand, in the Hague Convention (XIII) Concern-
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, while this article is repeated in
substance, it is immediately followed by another article: VIII: "A neutral Government is
bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any vessel
within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hos-
tile operations, against a Power with which that Government is at peace." How the two
articles can be reconciled seems to lie more in the realm of metaphysics than law. See
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The next several sections prescribe technical rules for the enforce-
ment of the first three sections
Title VI of the 1917 Act authorizes officials designated by the Presi-
dent to confiscate "any arms or munitions of war, or other articles" at-
tempted to be exported from the United States "in violation of law" and
does not relate that enforcement authority only to laws designed to pro-
tect the "neutrality" of the United States. This provision has been ex-
panded over the years, and given ever increasing substance to the point
that it now amounts to a general authority in the president to control
entirely and for any foreign policy purpose the export of arms, ammuni-
tion and implements of war. In its current incarnation (1988) this author-
ity of the President to control the import and export of defense articles
and defense services involves inscribing the categories of controlled items
and services in a "Munitions List" and authority to issue or refuse li-
censes is lodged in the State Department with discretion to be exercised
in coordination with the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. In fact, the bureaucratic coordination of munitions export license
applications is a complex matter in which issues of the legal restraints on
"neutrals" have little if any role.""
V. CONCLUSIONS
Looking back at the American legislation, it seems clear that concep-
tions of international law played little if any role in the drafting of the
Neutrality Act of 1794 and its successors. The current controls on the
export of arms, ammunition and implements of war are related solely to
policy, not at all to legal or moral considerations, except perhaps such
legal considerations, like treaty obligations, that are embedded in policy
by the operation of municipal American law under our Constitution. But
the fact that legislation is the product of political choice does not mean
that the uniform political choices of many countries, or the political
choices that seem likely to be uniform because compelled by similar polit-
ical factors in the foreign relations of many countries, do not reflect a
legislative process in the international legal order. There is no reason why
international law cannot be made by political decisions on the part of
states as legislators; the analogy is to municipal law processes in which
the personal motivations of members of a legislative body are irrelevant
to considerations of whether the product of their actions, legislation, is
binding as law within the legal order in which they function as legislators.
From this point of view, reviewing the overall conceptions that seem
to be reflected in the treaties and in American legislation, and in the light
of about three thousand years of jurisprudential thought in which the ba-
Rubin, The Laws of War, 76 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 139, 142-143 (1982).
46. See Rubin, United States Export Controls: An Immodest Proposal, 36 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 633 (1968), for some indication of the coordination process as of 1968 and the lack of
any role for lawyers in it. The current statute is, if anything, more complex.
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sic principles seem remarkably stable, it is possible to attempt some
generalizations.
The first would be that the basic underlying principle is not one of
substance at all, but one of a distribution of authority. Under that princi-
ple, pretentions to universal legislative authority exist only when "univer-
sal" religions or political organizations exist which in fact persuade their
subjects of their authority. That condition does not exist today, when
statesmen might pay lip-service to some common substantive ideals, such
as a commitment to human rights, but absolutely deny the legislative au-
thority of any body beyond their municipal constitutional orders to trans-
late those ideals into "law." The legislative authority of the international
legal order does not rest on dominant, or even near universal, acquies-
cence or practice, but on express or implied consent. It is true that an
implied consent can be derived from rather distant evidence, but in the
final analysis, the more indirect the evidence of that consent, the less
likely it is to convince the statesmen who must be convinced in order
actually to affect the conduct of states. Moral suasion can be used, but
claims, diplomatic correspondence, appeals to tribunals and the other en-
forcement mechanisms of the international legal order do not flow from
mere moral positions, however widely held.
From this it can be concluded that there is now no overarching natu-
ral law of "neutrality."
Nonetheless, it can be seen that there is a distinction in positive law,
and possibly in natural law, between the acts of states as such and the
acts of individuals. Obligations relating to neutrality contained in treaties
and derived from any analysis of custom as evidence of law seem to em-
phasize territoriality. Even in the export control laws of the United
States, which do affect the legal liability of Americans acting outside the
territory of the United States by defining "export" to include such things
as the imparting of "technical data," mere information, to foreigners in
any place,"7 there is implicit a limit to American authority to make rules.
It is the international legal order that defines the limit of that authority.
It would probably be undisputed, if ever anything were undisputed
among international lawyers, that there can be no obligations under inter-
national law that would require a state to act outside of its legal capacity
to act. Thus, while there might be some disagreement as to precisely what
actions taken by a state within its own territory represent "unneutral"
behavior of that state, and that determination is made by reference to
treaties and general international law subject to a great deal of interpre-
tation and dispute,"8 it is probably correct that in its essence the law of
47. This was the principal basis for the conviction and imprisonment of one former CIA
agent and the indictment of another in 1982 for activities that they argued occurred entirely
in Libya. See Rubin, To Prosecute Qaddafi's American Mercenaries, N. Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1981, at A34, for citation and some quotations from the relevant statutes.
48. For example, the United States regarded as within its concept of "neutrality" the
exchange of fifty overage armed naval vessels for control over British bases in the Western
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neutrality fixes obligations on a state but not directly on its nationals.
Thus direct transfer of military vessels, legislation favoring one party to a
foreign war, the use of public land to support one party's military effort,
and similar public acts of the public authority seem to engage the public
international law of neutrality. The failure to control the acts of nationals
abroad probably does not, and it might even be questioned whether his-
torically the failure to control the "unneutral" commercial acts of any
persons within the territory of the "neutral" state involves any degree of
state responsibility in the absence of treaty relating to the subject. The
inhibition on individual activity favorable to one or another belligerent
was historically the risk of loss; the capture of transferred property and
its condemnation in prize.
On the other hand, the extension of state authority into realms of
commerce hitherto thought distinct,4 ' and the general extension of con-
ceptions of municipal prescriptive jurisdiction to include acts done by for-
eigners abroad with only some (ever diminishing) impact on the territory
of the prescribing state, can be argued to have expanded the conception
of state responsibility. But many states have reacted to new assertions of
legislative authority by the United States, whose legislature, after all,
does not contain British, West German, Japanese or other foreign repre-
sentatives, not by imitation and expanding their own legislative purview
to create a new pattern of overlapping jurisdictions, but by resisting the
new assertions as beyond the legal authority of the United States in the
Hemisphere in 1940. At that time the United States was not yet a belligerent in the Second
World War. The exchange clearly favored the British in their fight with Germany on both
ends of the deal; it increased their naval capacity and relieved them of a defense burden in
an area of the Empire into which German military planners might have wanted to move
because of the bases' strategic locations near important shipping lanes through which con-
traband cargo was being sent to England. The American reasoning rested on the assertion
that the vessels "were not built, armed, equipped as, or converted into vessels of war with
the intent that they should enter the service of a belligerent." 39 Op. Att'y Gen. 484 (1940).
I suppose the Attorney General (Robert Jackson) was living in the same world as Sir Win-
ston Churchill. See 2 W. CHURCHILL, THE SECOND WORLD WAR 353 (3rd ed., rev. 1951).
Churchill was entirely aware that the United States action was "unneutral," but drew a fine
distinction between unneutral acts and belligerent acts. Cp. id. at 358: "The transfer to
Great Britain of fifty American warships was a decidedly unneutral act by the United
States," with his explanation to the Parliament that "Only very ignorant persons would
suggest that the transfer of American destroyers to the British flag constitutes the slightest
violation of international law, or affects in the smallest degree the non-belligerency of the
United States." Id. at 367. Because the qualification of an act by one state cannot legally
bind another, and Nazi Germany was legally as capable as the British and Americans of
categorizing the deal in legal terms, and a qualification as "belligerent" act would not have
been inconsistent with the facts, I confess to being a very ignorant person, but nonetheless
thankful that the deal was consummated.
49. This point has frequently been exaggerated in legal argument. The Dutch United
East India Company established in 1602 was in all significant ways an arm of the state; the
English East India Company had the legal authority under English municipal law both to
trade and, in some cases, to go to "war," and did so in India and elsewhere, where the
niceties of European classifications were not appreciated.
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international legal order. 0 Thus, the degree to which state responsibility
will be engaged by the failure of states to control the commerce or over-
seas activities of their nationals seems very questionable at the moment.
It is entirely possible that the United States, with its great claims to legis-
lative authority over both its nationals and foreigners based on minimal
territorial contacts with the United States, has a higher standard of be-
havior if it wants to avoid international claims, than other states which
do not make equivalent claims to jurisdiction. If that is so, then United
States assertions of authority, denial of responsibility, and apparent dis-
regard of the views of other states on the issues, threaten the equal appli-
cation of the law to all its subjects and with it the stability and security
that the law provides.
From this point of view, an entire new vista is opened for study, in
which the law of "neutrality" re-enters the natural law domain as a mere
aspect of the ancient rule, res inter alios acta reflected in the law regard-
ing jus standi. There is irony in this, since the modern spokesmen for
natural law theory seem the most inclined to disregard. national sover-
eignty as part of the law-making process, substituting reason and moral
perception for formal consent as an exercise of national discretion. But
since the trend led by the United States seems to have hit serious opposi-
tion, and some retreat will be compelled either by the politics of interna-
tional trade and our alliance structure, or by direct acknowledgment of
the limits the international legal order places on national jurisdiction, fur-
ther analysis of this aspect of the modern law of "neutrality" seems
premature.
A final implication of all this is not premature to mention. If the
legal responsibility of a state under evolving conceptions of jurisdiction is
expanding to make a state legally responsible for the acts of others, in-
cluding other states whose activities could have been prevented by the
"neutral's" exercise of its jurisdiction, serious questions can arise about
the failure of "neutral" states, like Austria and Sweden, to exercise that
jurisdiction. For example, would it be a breach of Austrian neutrality for
Austria to fail to erect a missile defense system that could deny overflight
50. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief submitted by Australia, Canada, France and the
United Kingdom in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 24(5)
I.L.M. 1293 (1985). The petitioners and Japan argue that the United States antitrust laws
cannot properly extend to forbid acts of foreign defendants mandated by the foreign state
within whose territory those acts occurred, even if the result of those acts has an effect
within American territory. Instead of adopting a universal "effects" doctrine as the basis for
overlapping jurisdictions, the petitioners deny the doctrine justifies the reach abroad of the
American prescriptions. Cf. British Airways Board v. Laker Airways Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 413
(H.L. 1984), summarized in 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 141 (1985). The House of Lords in that case
held that the alleged conspirators against Laker Airways, accused of violating the American
antitrust laws, could be tried by each country involved with regard to that part of their
actions that fell within the jurisdiction of each country. The Lords' conception of actions
falling within each country's jurisdiction was not based on remote impacts, but on actual
physical activities by licensees of the petitioners carried out within the territory of the
United States.
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of Austrian airspace to NATO cruise missiles? Or Soviet equivalents
aimed at NATO bases in Italy? Must Austrian nationals in West Ger-
many be prevented by Austrian legislation from participating in any as-
pect of West German industry that contributes to NATO defense? It
seems to me that a "natural-moral" law case can be made out that exten-
sions of national jurisdiction have created these new responsibilities.
On the other hand, if a fundamentally "positivist" view is taken of
the law, then what constitutes "neutral" behavior is not susceptible of
grand generalities. As long as Austria's obligations are codified in the ba-
sic treaty,5 1 then the treaty means whatever its parties intend it to mean,
and references to general international conceptions in the documents re-
lated to the treaty and in Austrian municipal law are meaningless in the
absence of diplomatic correspondence to clarify what interpretation of
general international law is intended. To the degree that state practice
"accepted as law" is a source of clarification, differences in interpretations
of the practice and the degree to which any particular practice is accepted
as "law" or merely asserted by one party to be "law" are immediately
apparent. Are Sweden's obligations under Sweden's own interpretation of
neutrality identical with the obligations equally strongly asserted for it-
self by Finland? Are Soviet interpretations, or American, under which all
acts favorable to the one side are considered consistent with neutrality,
and all acts unfavorable considered questionable, in anyway binding on
anybody? Yet, because as a matter of politics those assertions cannot be
totally disregarded, the adjustments in national policy made in considera-
tion of the views and anticipated sensitivities of others can be viewed as
part of the legislative process of positive international law.
Some closer analysis of the evolution of practice seems also neces-
sary. For example, if the Soviet explanation for its submarines' presence
in Swedish waters beyond the scope of the rules of "innocent passage"
assumed in the Corfu Channel Case, or "transit passage" as negotiated in
the 1982 UNCLOS III Convention, is to deny that presence or to excuse
it on the ground of navigational error or accident, then there is some per-
suasive evidence that Swedish "neutral" obligations toward the Soviet
Union do not extend to allowing Soviet naval penetration of the closed
areas; but perhaps the situation would be different if NATO submarines
were permitted access analogous to that which Sweden denies to the So-
viet Union. But these are questions which I believe bring us to the fron-
tiers of the current law-making process, where assertions of law are based
more on perceptions of political advantage than on any analysis of values
agreed to or inherent in the legal order.
51. State Treaty for the Reestablishment of an Independent and Democratic Austria,
Vienna, 15 May 1955, 217 U.N.T.S. 223.
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